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I. ABSTRACT

Municipal fiscal insolvency has become the central challenge
facing American cities. Municipal fiscal insolvency is the result of
many factors, including risk taking, fiscal mismanagement,
corruption, and the absence of political will to make hard choices.
There are also structural factors at play-specifically, local
government organization and the fiscal constraints states place on
their subdivisions play a significant role in the ability of
municipalities to achieve sustainability and growth. These factors are
rarely included in the discussion on municipal fiscal insolvency, and
understandably so. It is hard to determine the role that local
government organization plays in undermining the fiscal health of a
municipality relative to issues such as the pension crisis or corruption.
While most municipalities address events of fiscal crisis through
negotiation and the intervention of states, a small but increasing
* Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University.
B.Arch., Howard University; MPP, Harvard Kennedy School; J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center. The author would like to thank Paul Diller for the invitation to participate in the
Willamette Symposium and the editors of the Willamette Law Review for their patience.
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number have turned to Chapter 9 bankruptcy. While bankruptcy is
controversial, it holds many advantages for cities and their creditors.
However, there is more that Chapter 9 could do if bankruptcy courts
were allowed to require municipalities and states to address the
structural drivers that might accrue to local government organization.
This would require a significant reworking of Chapter 9, however,
and would implicate serious constitutional issues. Without the
exploration of these changes, bankruptcy courts cannot ensure that the
structural determinants that might have contributed to the default in
the first place don't happen again.
II. INTRODUCTION

The municipal insolvency crisis is the defining challenge facing
American cities. Increasingly municipalities large and small are
struggling to maintain or expand service delivery, address crumbling
infrastructures, stem the tide of resident and capital flight, reconcile
the conflicting realities of inter-municipal competitive pressures and
address a growing municipal employee benefit crisis. Municipal
insolvency is in no way a new issue-cities like New York, New
York; Washington, D.C. and Miami, Florida have all at one time or
another stood on the brink of insolvency and managed to effect a turn
around.1 But the multiplicity of current and projected threats to
municipal fiscal stability threatens to overwhelm the capacity of states
and their subdivisions to effectively and proactively respond. The
specter of municipal insolvency is morphing from being a marginal or
episodic phenomenon to a constant thread in local government
finance and general welfare.
Historically, insolvency has been a problem for special purpose
municipalities; i.e. utilities districts or school districts. 2 Increasingly,
however, general purpose municipalities are facing fiscal distress as
they attempt to reconcile the rising costs of public service delivery
with a rapidly diminishing public appetite for new taxes. General
purpose local governments face unprecedented challenges with
funding pension systems and addressing infrastructure needs that have

1. See, e.g., Omer Kimhi, Reviving Cities: Legal Remedies to Municipal Financial
Crises, 88 B.U.L. REV. 633, 634-35 (2008) (discussing the occasional phenomenon of
municipal fiscal distress and occurrences in a number of cities over the past several decades).
2. Michael De Angelis & Xiaowei Tian, United States. Chapter 9 Municipal
Bankuptcy-Utilzation,Avoidance andImpact in UNTIL DEBT Do Us PART: SUBNATIONAL
DEBT, INSOLVENCY, AND MARKETS 311, 312 (Octaviano Canuto & Lili Liu eds., 2013).

2014]

EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES

663

long gone unaddressed. Looming over all of this is an estimated $3.5
billion of municipal bond debt and more than 19 million state and
local government employees, most of them represented by labor
unions. 3
Persistent insolvency may lead to a complete incapacity to
maintain obligations to citizens and creditors alike. In the past several
years municipalities such as Orange County, California and Jefferson
County, Alabama have filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 9 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 9).4 More than any other city,
Detroit, Michigan's long and epic slide into insolvency and its
historic bankruptcy filing have become emblematic of the fragile
fiscal state of many municipal governments. The specter of everincreasing instances of fiscal insolvency among general purpose
governments and, more specifically, the recent municipal bankruptcy
filings, are the subject of a growing body of scholarly inquiry and
debate.s More events of insolvency (and possible bankruptcy filings)
are expected in cities all over the nation. 6
Municipal bankruptcy-like corporate bankruptcy-is viewed as
an extreme alternative to a state takeover. Many regard a municipal
bankruptcy filing as a last resort and as in the case of a private
corporation, utter failure. Municipalities enjoy relatively broad
discretion under Chapter 97 to readjust their debt obligations in the
face of insolvency.
This discretion comes with few strings
attached-municipalities enjoy far greater ability under federal
3. See Jim Powell, What Are The Most Likely Outcomes Of State And Municipal
FinancialCrises?, FORBES, Aug. 20, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jimpowell/2013/08/20
/what-are-the-most-likely-outcomes-of-state-and-municipal-financial-crises/.
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46 (2012).
5. See, e.g., Michelle Wilde Anderson, The New Minimal Cities, 123 YALE L.J. 1118
(2014); Melissa B. Jacoby, The DetroitBanrAptcy, Pre-Eligibility,41 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
849 (2014); Kimhi, supra note 1; Omer Kimbi, Chapter9 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Solution
in Search of a Problem, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 351 (2010); C. Scott Pryor, Municipal
Bankruptcy: When Doing Less is DoingBest, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 85 (2014); David A. Skeel,
States of Bankruptcy, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 677 (2012); Richard Trotter, Running On Empty
Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9
Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45 (2011); Frederick Tung, After Orange County Reforming
California MunicipalBankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885 (2002); Elizabeth M. Watkins,
In Defense of the Chapter9 Option: Explonag the Promise of a Municipal Bankruptcy as a
Mechanism for StructuralPoliticalReform, 39 J. LEGIS. 89 (2012-13).
6. Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles Into
Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/us/ detroit-filesfor-bankruptcy.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0.
7. 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46.
8. See id.§ §941-46.
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bankruptcy laws to control the adjustments of debts than do private
corporations under Chapters 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 9
Bankruptcy courts are explicitly prohibited from interfering with the
political or governmental powers of the debtor municipality and, by
extension, the state.' 0 Consequently when a municipality files for
bankruptcy questions about structural governmental issues or broader
questions about the role of state policy in contributing to the crisis are
off the table.
In her article, In Defense of the Chapter9 Option:Explorng the
Promise of a Municipal Bankruptcy as a Mechanism for Structural
PoliticalReform, Elizabeth Watkins makes a compelling argument for
municipal bankruptcy's beneficial role in addressing the structural
drivers of insolvency."
Watkins cites the additional disclosure,
insulation from political conflicts of interest, the ability to drive
political reform and the role of stigma in encouraging citizen
engagement as advantages of bankruptcy over state intervention.12
Watkins casts municipal bankruptcy as a mechanism for forcing a
confrontation with local government law in order to address
challenges that the political process and the nature of municipal
finance are unlikely or incapable of bringing about.
In promoting municipal bankruptcy as a worthwhile option for
structural reform, Watkins acknowledges that the Tenth Amendment
protections embedded within Chapter 9 limit its potential as a tool for
structural reform.13 She goes on to make a compelling case for how
municipal bankruptcy aids structural reform, but she leaves
unaddressed the issue of whether the Tenth Amendment limitations
are desirable or even necessary. States set considerable constraints on
municipal finance, including the ability to petition for bankruptcy
relief. If they allow their municipalities to petition for bankruptcy,
however, the municipalities have the opportunity to have a federal
court readjust their debts without having to ever consider the extent to
which matters such as local government organization contribute to
cycles of insolvency. This is significant because there is ample
evidence that local government organization matters impact a
municipality's fiscal health. For instance, the local boundary problem
9. Compare id.§§ 901-46, with §§ 701-84, and§§ 1101-74.
10. See id. § 904.
11. See Watkins, supranote 5.
12. Seeid at 104-13.
13. See Watkins, supra note 5, at 91.
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has produced all types of imbalances in the modem metropolis that
imperil older central cities and increasingly inner suburbs. It is
impossible to consider the contemporary municipal insolvency crisis
without understanding the historic and present role of municipal
boundaries. 14
The central question in considering the role of Chapter 9
bankruptcy in the midst of what is likely a trend of growing municipal
insolvency is: Can the municipal bankruptcy process be used to
encourage, incentivize, or outright force states to examine how local
government organization issues place some municipalities on an
inevitable path to insolvency?
If state local government organization law allows one unit of a
metropolitan area to face a drastically different fiscal fate than the
other metropolitan area jurisdictions adjacent to or in close proximity
to its borders, why is it impermissible for review in a municipal
bankruptcy proceeding? Is it fair to allow the federal government to
adjust contractual obligations on behalf of municipalities in
metropolitan areas that as a whole are prosperous and, save the limits
of municipal boundaries, could contribute greatly to placing their
weakest link, or links, on a path to solvency? Furthermore, is there a
significant Tenth Amendment concern when the voluntary statesanctioned petition is the essential first step for entering into a
Chapter 9 proceeding?
In this essay I explore broadly an expansion of Chapter 9
bankruptcy to allow bankruptcy judges to consider issues of local
government organization in addressing a municipality's debt
readjustment proposals in a bankruptcy proceeding. I aspire only to
sketch the theoretical and legal considerations related to how matters
of local government organization might be broached in a Chapter 9
proceeding. In Part III, I will examine the municipal fiscal crisis and
the role that local government organization has played. In Part IV, I
will move beyond the focus on corruption and local politicians to
outline the key structural drivers of insolvency. Specifically, Part V
reconsiders the Tenth Amendment protections which limit the court's
reach into the governmental affairs of the municipality or the state
and explores the reasons for expanding the judiciary's role under
14. See Christopher J. Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis:NewInsights in
the Age ofMobile Capital,73 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 505, 531-40 (2012) [hereinafter Annexation and
the Mid-Size Metropolis] (discussing the relationship between boundary elasticity and
municipal fiscal health).
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Chapter 9.
III. A SNAPSHOT OF THE MUNICIPAL INSOLVENCY CRISIS
In 2012, Stockton, California filed for bankruptcy. Stockton was
one of three California cities to file for bankruptcy protection in a
single month. With 292,000 residents at the time of its filing,
Stockton became the largest city in United States history to default.
In the fall of 2013, Stockton's city council approved a plan for the
city to adjust its debts and exit bankruptcy after reaching a deal with a
bond issuer to restructure more than $150 million of outstanding debt
obligations. 16 But not even a year after Stockton, California's
bankruptcy filing the issue is old news and old history. The bar
moved. Detroit's July 18, 2013 Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing made it
the largest American city to ever file for municipal bankruptcy. The
$18 billion Detroit owes also makes its filing the largest municipal
bankruptcy in American history in terms of debt.17 Michigan
Governor Rick Snyder and Detroit Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr
called the municipal bankruptcy filing the only viable option for relief
for the city's more than $18 billion in long-term obligations.' 8
Detroit's bankruptcy trial began September 2, 2014 and will
adjudicate the city's 400 page "plan of adjustment" which lays out

15. See Watkins, supranote 5, at 89.
16. See Jim Christie, Stockton City Council Backs Plan to Exit Bankruptcy, REUTERS,
Oct. 3, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/04/us-stockton-bankruptcyexit-plan-idUSBRE99302W20131004; see also, Pryor, supranote 4, at 87-97 (discussing the
events surrounding the Stockton bankruptcy with a specific focus on the impact to municipal
bond debt holders); Rick Lyman & Mary Williams Walsh, California City's Return to
Solvency, With Pension Problem Unsolved N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.
com/2013/12/06/us/stockton-set-to-return-to-solvency-with-pension-problem-unsolved.html?p

agewanted=all&module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar/o2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%
3A8%22%7D.
17. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Turns to
Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/9/us/detroit-filesfor-bankruptcy-html?pagewanted=all& r=1&.; Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcy for
Detroit, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014241278873
23993804578614144173709204.html; Michael A. Fletcher, Detroit goes bankrupt, largest
municipal fing in US. history, WASH. POST, July 18, 2013, http://articles.washington
post.com/2013-07-18/business/40652164_Ikevyn-orr-emergency-manager-largest-municipal
-bankruptcy.
18. See Khalil AlHajal, Detroitbankruptcy was 'the only viable option,'says Gov. Rick
Snyder, MLIVE.COM (July 18, 2013, 6:17 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2
013/07/detroitbankruptcy-was-the_onl.html.
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how it will pay its creditors and restructure its debt.' 9 At press time
trial proceedings were still underway.
Concerns over municipal insolvency were not triggered by these
epic bankruptcies. The issue was already receiving an increasing
amount of attention in light of the 2008-2009 economic crises,
mounting fiscal pressures facing U.S. municipalities, and the growing
crisis over pension obligations.2 0 There were 239 municipal
bankruptcy filings between 1980 and 2010.21 More than 600
municipal bankruptcy petitions were filed in 2011-most of them by
small, special-purpose districts, such as utility districts and rural
municipalities. 22 This compares with only 252 filings between 1980
and 2011.23 For additional context, there were 51,259 business filings
under Chapters 7 and 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code in 2010
alone. 24 Historically, general purpose government debt defaults are
rare. A Moody's Investors Services study "found that only three
general purpose governments rated by Moody's had defaulted on
long-term bonds in 30 years." 25
While bankruptcy filings by municipalities under Chapter 9 of
the Bankruptcy Code are historically rare, filings are on the rise. 26
Eight municipalities have filed for bankruptcy protection since 2010:
Detroit, Michigan; San Bernardino, California; Mammoth Lakes,
California; Stockton, California; Jefferson County, Alabama;
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Central Falls, Rhode Island; and Boise

19. See, e.g., Sarah Cwiek, DetroitBankruptcyBattle Begins in FederalCourt,
NPR.ORG (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/09/02/345056007/detroit-bankruptcybattle-begins-in-federal-court.
20. See, e.g., Kimhi, supra note 1; Michael A. Fletcher, Harrisburg, Pa., Other Cities
Overwhelmed by Economic Downturn and Debt, WASH. POST (June 21, 2010), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/06/20/AR2010062003544.html; Ian Lovett,
Third City in California Votes to Seek Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2012), http://w
ww.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/us/san-bemardino-council-votes-to-file-bankruptcy.html?ref-bus
iness; Cyrus Sanati, What the Next Bankruptcy Wave Will Bning, Dealbook, N.Y. TIMEs
(Mar. 4, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/03/04/what-the-next-bankruptcy-wave-wil
1-bring/?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar/o2C%7B%221%22%3A%22RI%3A8
%22%7D.
21. Mike Barnhart, Is Bankruptcy Right for Our MunicipalGovernments?, HUFFINGTON
POST (2/27/2013 6:10 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-barnhart/municipal-bankrupt
cyb.2777010.html.
22. Angelis & Tian, supranote 2, at 312
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id

26. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-46. (2012); see Tung, supra,note 5, at 886.
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County, Idaho.2 7
The municipal fiscal crisis is unfolding against a backdrop of an
intricate and expansive system of local governments throughout the
country. Local governments are many and diverse. There are about
90,056 local governments, including 3,031 counties, 19,519 large and
small cities, 16,360 towns, 12,880 school systems, and 38,266 special
district governments responsible for services like hospitals and fire
protection.28 Municipalities' fiscal obligations are principally to their
citizens to whom they provide health, safety, and general welfare
services and protections; bondholders who finance their debt;
employees who depend on city governments for their livelihood;
recipients of essential infrastructure and services provided by both
general and special purpose municipalities; and retirees who have
paid into pension funds upon which they count on to support them
until death (and potentially afterwards in the case of surviving
spouses). Different dynamics are at play when a sewer district,
school district, or the city of Detroit is unable to pay their bills.
Limited or special purpose governments perhaps provide the best
prism through which to view fiscal insolvency brought on by fiscal
mismanagement or risk taking. By their very nature limited purpose
governments have a narrow range of external factors affecting their
General purpose
ability to fulfill their service obligations.
municipalities, however, are beset with an array of pressing issues
that seem to be converging into a perfect storm of urgent, hard to
resolve choices and consequences for states and local communities.
Scholars have identified economic decline, tax base erosion,
demographic changes, federal and state mandates, federal revenue
cuts, state tax levy limits, recessions, and mismanagement as the
leading causes of local government fiscal distress. 29 Recently, the
causes that have received most of the attention are the role of
corruption and mismanagement, the public employee pension crisis,
rising cuts to state funding for municipalities, and the manner in
which suburbanization shapes local finances.
27. Brad Plumer, Detroit isn't alone. The US. cities that have gone bankrupt, in one
map, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 18, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkb
log/wp/2013/07/18/detroit-isnt-alone-the-u-s-cities-that-have-gone-bankrupt-in-one-map/.
28. See CARMA HOGUE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATION SUMMARY REPORT: 2012, at 1 (2013), available at http://www2.census.gov/g
ovs/cog/gl2_org.pdf.

29. See Charles K. Coe, Local Government Fiscal Crises: Emerging Best Practices, 68
PUB. ADMIN. REv. 759, 759 (2008), availableat http://www.jstor.org/stable/25145657.
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First, it is impossible to broach the topic of municipal insolvency
without acknowledging the poor decision-making, questionable risk
taking, miscalculations in budgeting, and outright corruption that have
contributed to the fiscal demise of many cities. Scholars have
recently examined the impact of public officials' corruption on the
size and allocation of state expenditures, finding that corruption
increases state spending by more than five percent.30 City corruption
has loomed large in lay and scholarly analyses of the causes of
insolvency, and it has been a prominent factor in how the struggles of
Detroit and other cities is discussed and understood. 3 1 This is
understandable given the actions of the city's imprisoned former
Detroit mayor, Kwame Kilpatrick, and the manner in which
fraudulent actions during his administration gutted the assets of the
pension fund and then attempted to cover it up by pursuing
questionable debt-financing schemes. 32 While corruption of the
character and scale as that which defined Detroit's recent political
leadership must be recognized for its role in sealing the city's fiscal
fate, corruption tales offer little in the form of prescriptive insight for
how to address persistent insolvency. Once the bad guys are locked
up, grave structural issues remain.
The pension crisis is perhaps the most urgent dilemma facing
cities. The pension crisis is both a state and a municipal problem, and
the challenges states face with meeting retirement benefit obligations
to state workers has reached a crisis level as almost every state has
taken steps in recent years to address public employee pension
costs. 3 3 Changing demographics, the tendency of political officials to
30. See generally, Cheol Liu & John L. Mikesell, The Impact of Public Officials'
Corruption on the Size and Allocation of US. State Spending, 74 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 346
(2014), availableat http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/puar.12212/full.
31. See, e.g., Maria O'Brien Hylton, Central Falls Retirees v. Bondholders: Assessing
Fear of Contagion in Chapter 9 Proceedings 59 WAYNE L. REV. 525, 554 (2013); Tresa

Baldas, The High Cost of Corruption:How Kwame Kilpatrick's Cnimes Deepened Detroit's
Crisis,DETROIT FREE PRESS (Oct. 6, 2013) http://www.freep.com/article/20131006NEWSO
1/310060083/Kilpatrick-corruption-costs; Jess Bidgood, Rhode Island: Central Falls Mayor
Quits andIs to Plead Guilty to Corruption,N. Y. TIMES (Sep. 19, 2012), http://www.nytime
s.com/2012/09/20/us/rhode-island-central-falls-mayor-quits-and-is-to-plead-guilty-to-corruptio

n.html?_r-0; Floyd Norris, Portent of Pen] for Mni Bondholders, N. Y. TIMES (June 6,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/business/bankruptcy-in-alabama-county-offers-wa
rning-for-other-municipalities.html?pagewanted=all; Kevin D. Williamson, The Corrupt
Bargain,THE NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Sept. 2, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/arti
cle/386875/corrupt-bargain-kevin-d-williamson.

32. See Baldas, supranote 31.
33. See Rick Lyman & Mary Williams Walsh, PublicPension Tabs Multiply as States
Defer Costs andHardChoices, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2014, http://nyti.ms/lk5oQdH.
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agree to long-term benefits increases, and the decline in the market
value of pension fund assets all contributes to the growing instability
in public employee pensions. 34 According to the credit-rating agency
Moody's, "Illinois's net public-employee pension liabilities now
amount to $133 billion, or 241 percent of the state's total annual
revenues; in Connecticut, 190 percent; in New Jersey, 137 percent;
and in New York, 17 percent. America's state and municipal
pensions concede that they are underfunded by more than $1
trillion."35
Sixty-one cities have a gap of more than $217 billion between
what cities "promised their workers in pensions and retiree health care
and what [cities] ha[ve] saved to pay that bill."36 San Jose,
California's city pension payments increased from $73 million in
2001 to $245 million in 2012, which constituted 27% of the city's
general fund budget. 37 In San Diego, California, "retirement fund
payments soared from $43 million in 1999 to $231.2 million in
2012."" Chicago's pension funding crisis has captured that state's
attention, with the Illinois governor signing a bill intended to boost
funding for two of the city's public pension funds. 39 Central Falls,
Rhode Island and Vallejo, California both went bankrupt because of
police and firefighter pension obligations. 4 0 In Desert Hot Springs,
California "about $7 million of the city's $10.6 million annual payroll
went to its thirty-nine member police force." 4 1
34. See Pryor, supra note 5, at 99-103 (citing Thomas J. Healey, et al., Underfunded
Pensionsin the United States: The Size of the Problem, the Obstacles in Reform and the Path
Forward(M-RCBG Faculty, Working Paper No. 2012-08-25, 2012)).
35. Richard J. Riordan & Tim Rutten, A Plan to Avert the Pension Criss, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 4, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/opinion/a-plan-to-avert-the-pension-crisis.

html?_r-0.
36. Press Release, Pew Charitable Trusts, Pew Study Finds 61 Cities' Retirement
Systems Face $217 Billion Gap, Jan. 15, 2013, http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/newsroom/press-releases/000 1/0 1/01/pew-study-finds-6 1-cities-retirement-systems-face-2 17-billion
-gap.
37. Liz Farmer, The "B" Word: Is MunicipalBankruptcy's Stigma Fading,GOVERNING
(Mar. 2013), http://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-bword-stigma-municipal-bankrupt
cy-going-away.html.
38. Id.
39. See Karen Pierog, Illinois GovernorSigns Chicago Pension Reform Bill, REUTERS,
June 9, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/09/usa-chicago-pensions-id
USL2NOOQIT120140609.
40. See Rick Lyman & Mary Williams Walsh, Police Salaries and Pensions Push
CaliforniaCity to Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/28/us/
police-salaries-and-pensions-push-california-city-to-brink.html?pagewanted=all& r-0.
41. See id.
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Another facet of rising municipal distress involves the extent to
which intergovernmental aid has been dramatically cut.42
Intergovernmental aid includes the grants, transfers, and other funds a
city receives from federal, state, county, or other local governments.4 3
On average, state aid funds nearly a third of local government
budgets, and that aid fell by $12.6 billion, or 2.6%, in fiscal year
2010.44 In the wake of the recession that ended in 2009, reductions in
intergovernmental aid were the driving force for declining revenues in
nine of the largest thirty cities in the country.4 5 Intergovernmental
grants play an essential role in the ability of local governments to
achieve fiscal equalization.4 6
Lastly, financial instability in many cities reflects the toll that
suburbanization has taken on municipal finances. Scholars have
explored the links between metropolitan fragmentation and economic
development and overall municipal fiscal health.4 7 Richard Briffault
aptly deduced that "[t]he fundamental feature of contemporary
metropolitan governance is the operation of locally bounded fiscal
and regulatory autonomy in regions where economic and social
activity transcends local boundaries." 4 8
State boundary policy separates groups of people in the
42. See Rob Gurwitt, As States Cut Aid, Localities Learn to Do Less With Less, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS: STATELINE, Oct. 3, 2011, http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/h

eadlines/as-states-cut-aid-localities-learn-to-do-less-with-less-85899375306#; Andrea Kelly,
State Budget Decisions: Not Much Better or Worse for Local Officials, ARIZONA PUBLIC
MEDIA, June 24, 2014, https://news.azpm.org/p/local-news/2014/6/24/38224-state-budgetdecisions-ar e-not-much-better-not-much-worse-for-local-governments-next-year/.
43. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, AMERICA'S BIG CITIES IN VOLATILE TIMES:
MEETING FISCAL CHALLENGES AND PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 10 (2013) [hereinafter

MEETING FISCAL CHALLENGES], available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/ 201

3/11/1 l/AmericasBigCitiesinVolatileTimes.pdf
44. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, THE LOCAL SQUEEZE: FALLING REVENUES AND
GROWING DEMAND FOR SERVICES CHALLENGE CITIES, COUNTIES, AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS 1

(2012), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/Assets/2012/06/PewCities_ Local-Sq
ueeze report.pdf.
45. See MEETING FISCAL CHALLENGES, supra note 43, at 8.

46. See generally Bo Zhao & Katherine Bradbury, DesigningState Aid Formulas, 28 J.
OF POL'Y ANALYSIS AND MGMT. 278, 279 (2009) (discussing the role of state aid in

equalizing tax base and resource disparities between localities, thus diminishing the threat of
resident and capital flight).
47. See Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis, supra note 14, at 532 nn.118-19
(2012).
48. See Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1136 (1996).
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metropolis who would otherwise receive public goods and
services from the same source. This separation leads to the
uneven distribution of metropolitan area benefits and
burdens and renders the freedom and self-determination
gains produced by liberal boundary policies a very costly
endeavor. There is a great deal of irrationality that goes into
these decisions as well. Narrative, imagination, and the
perception of risk are all highly irrational forces that have as
much influence on metropolitan ordering as does the need
for connections and information.4 9
The effects of suburbanization on the fiscal fate of cities are seen
in the burden cities with greater populations of poor residents
experience and how that impacts their overall capacity. Moreover,
central cities tend to have a greater share of tax exempt propertypublic parks, hospitals, stadiums, and municipal buildings-than their
suburban neighbors. 5 0 An examination of the intra-metropolitan and
spatial implications of uncompensated poverty spending in the
Southern California metropolitan region illustrates that poor cities are
more likely to have to exert a high fiscal effort to provide public
services.51 The study included the aforementioned San Bernardino
County, which is home to the city of San Bernardino. 52 San
Bernardino's decision to seek bankruptcy protection in 2012 came
amidst political feuds over provisions for police and fire with the
city's diminished tax base, which was attributable to the housing
crisis and the city's 15% unemployment rate. The study concluded
49. Christopher J. Tyson, MunicipalIdentity as Property, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 647,
669 (2014) [hereinafter Municipal Identity] (discussing how individual and group identity,
over time, fuses with notions of jurisdictional ordering to add a cultural component to the
investment in state boundary policy-particularly where notions of legal autonomy are
concerned); See Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market 19 GEO.
MASON L. REv. 637 (2012) (discussing how the Tiebout-style gains that flow from the
population sorting that occurs in highly fragmented metropolises is offset by the efficiency
losses for regional governance).
50. Timothy McNulty, Tax-exempt PropertiesAre Killing City Financially,Controller
Flaherty Says, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 13, 2000, http://news.google.com/newspaper
s?id=Z4wNAAAAIBAJ&sjid=JXADAAAAIBAJ&pg-2821%2C898994.
51. See Pascale M. Joassart-Marcelli, Juliet A. Musso & Jennifer R. Wolch, Fiscal
Consequences of ConcentratedPoverty in a Metropolitan Region, 95 ANNALS OF THE Ass'N
OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 336, 347-48 (2005).

52. Id.at 337, 348-49.
53. See Jim Christie & Tori Richards, San BernarnoBankruptcy CausedBy Political
Feuds,Denial,HUFFINGTON POST, July 16, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/15/
san-bernardino-bankruptcy-political-feuds-denial n_1674936.html.
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that metropolitan fragmentation increases resource disparities
between localities in a metropolitan region.5 4 Poverty both increases
the demand for services and reduces the ability of cities to provide
them. 5 Consequently, poor cities face an unfair disadvantage against
wealthier cities and are likely to experience growing fiscal pressure.56
While many factors led to San Bernadino's insolvency crisis, the
disparities produced within the fragmented metropolis increase the
likelihood that municipalities with high concentrations of poor
residents will slide into insolvency.
Detroit, Michigan is an example of the impact of
suburbanization. The Detroit metropolitan area remains highly
segregated along race and class lines. While the state of Michigan
has a revenue sharing program 57 that attempts to equalize municipal
funding in light of resource disparities, that program has experienced
significant cuts that have imperiled a number of cities, but none more
than Detroit. 8 Since 2003 Detroit is projected to have lost over $732
million in revenue sharing funds.59 Central cities and fiscally stressed
suburbs lost the most in the revenue sharing diversion, exacerbating
these municipalities' already lopsided ratio of service demand to
service delivery capacity.6 0
All of the forces and dynamics mentioned have, to varying
degrees, imperiled an increasing number of municipal budgets over
the past few decades. All are difficult issues, but taken separately
their respective remedy options expose their distinct and separate
Corruption and mismanagement can largely be
implications.
addressed through accountability and transparency measures and
political pressure for leadership changes generally carry the day. The
pension crisis requires protracted engagement and problem solving
that takes both legacy financial commitments and state-local
interdependence into consideration. But the state's role in fiscal
54. See Joassart-Marcelli et al., supra note 51, at 351.
55. Seeidat349-50.
56. See id
57. 2014 Mich. Pub. Acts 252, §§ 950-52.
58. See Jonathan Oosting, How Michigan'sRevenue Sharing 'Raid' Cost Communities
Billions for Local Services, MLIVE (Apr. 13, 2014, 1:13 AM), http://www.mlive.com/ lansingnews/index.ssfl2014/03/michigan revenue-sharingstrug.html; see also AMEREGIS, SEGREGATION, MINORITY SUBURBANIZATION AND FISCAL EQUITY IN THE DETROIT METROPOLITAN

AREA (2004), available at https://www.law.umn.eduluploads/55/ce/55cef573ab314eac47e32b
22f61b8a09/Detroit-NAACP-Min-Suburbanization-Report-2005.pdf.
59. See Oosting, supranote 58.
60. See AMEREGIS, supranote 58.
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equalization, suburbanization, and social attitudes about jurisdiction
and autonomy pose unique challenges for municipal fiscal
sustainability. A state's approach to the mal-distribution of resources
and capacity between tits cities involves political determinations
about the role of redistribution at the state level. Jurisdiction and
local autonomy are political constructs that reflect a state's judgments
and preferences for how to best reconcile self-determination and
collective responsibility in relation to the management of territory and
community. Furthermore, while the local boundary problem has to
date been addressed by scholars under the banner of Regionalism or
New Regionalism, 6 1 there is scant popular appreciation for its role in
shaping municipal finances.
IV.

BEYOND THE LOCAL FISCAL MISMANAGEMENT DISCOURSE

The dominant narrative on the municipal fiscal crisis focuses on
the agency of municipal actors and local politics rather than structural
forces which frame and constrain the choices cities have to make.
The mismanagement discourse focuses on local initiative, local
politics, corruption, and assessments of the agency of local officials in
financial decisions.
The emphasis on mismanagement is not
unwarranted, for in virtually every instance of municipal insolvency
lays a trail of questionable, if not outright, poor decision-making.
Decisions that spurred over-borrowing or a considerable miscalculation of the relative risk involved in taking on greater amounts
of debt implicate individual political actors as well as broader
dynamics in local political culture.
But the mismanagement discourse is fundamentally inadequate
and misleading. It woefully underestimates state plenary power over
local fiscal matters and obscures several under-appreciated realities
about contemporary local finance. First, the state controls, to a
significant degree, the fiscal fate of its local subdivisions. While
localism generally and home rule specifically has created spheres of
constitutionally or statutorily-based local autonomy characterized by
broad constructions of the police power with regard to social and
political affairs, such latitude is not reflected in financial affairs.
Specifically, state constitutions and statutes impose controls on nearly
all aspects of local financial management, including assessment,
61. For a definition and discussion of regionalism, old and new, see, e.g., Christopher J.
Tyson, Localism andInvoluntaryAnnexation: ReconsidenngApproaches to New Regionalism
87 TUL. L. REv. 297, 348-50 (2012) [hereinafter InvoluntaryAnnexation].
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taxation, indebtedness, budgeting, accounting, auditing and fiscal
reporting.6 2 As scholars like Clayton Gillette have recognized, states
exercise considerable plenary power over the fiscal matters of their
localities.6 3 States can enact "statutory schemes to withhold advanced
funds, create financial control boards, and place localities in
receivership," all of which means the state can extract substantial
concessions from distressed cities in return for state assistance.6 4
A second under-appreciated dimension of state influence over
city administration is the reality that a city's very identity is
controlled by state law.
The formation, reformation, and
extinguishment of municipal boundaries is entirely a creature of state
law. 65 The conditions under which central cities can expand their
boundaries varies from state to state, and few states afford central
cities the capacity to meaningfully impact the ability of other
municipalities to form in close proximity to them, force municipalities
to merge with them, or force unincorporated territories to be
subsumed into them. 66 Fiscal health is directly tied to the character of
the taxable land and population within a city's borders. The ability to
achieve and maintain certain service and amenity levels is part of an
unending cycle where the perceived benefits of a city determines who
enters and exits. In turn, those residents and their capacity for
generating tax revenues determine the services and amenities the city
can afford to offer. The boundary management regimes of most states
have largely functioned to increase rather than restrict political
fragmentation and inter-regional competition. 67
The prospects for diminishing the ways in which local
boundaries reproduce inequality are dim, which brings into focus a
third under-appreciated structural impediment to fiscal stability: the
emergence of popular movements for new incorporations within
existing metropolitan areas, commonly known as "cityhood"
movements. The anti-annexation and new municipal incorporation
movements signal a rising hostility towards the redistributive
62. See, DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A

FEDERAL SYSTEM 286 (7th ed. 2010).

63. See Clayton Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and the Strategic Use of
MunicipalBankruptcy,79 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 285, 314-15 (2012).
64. See id.at 315.
65. Id.at 314-15.
66. But see InvoluntaryAnnexation, supra note 61, at 303-25 (reviewing those states
which do afford municipalities the powers of involuntary annexation and extraterritorial
jurisdiction with regards to the municipal identity of other communities).
67. See id.
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obligations of sharing municipal territory with dissimilarly situated
others.6 8 The white and multi-racial class flight at the core of these
movements is nothing new, but the rise in common interest
communities and privatized local government adds a new dimension
to a long-standing phenomenon. There is a rapidly diminishing
appetite for any shared responsibility for alleviating or even managing
the effects of persistent poverty. Smaller local governments provide
greater opportunities for hyper segregation and a narrow, elitist vision
of citizenship.
When the structural realities of city fiscal powerlessness, the
state's control over local boundaries, and the growing demand for
new municipal incorporations is taken into account, the fiscal crisis
emerges as a phenomenon borne less out of local agency and more a
manifestation of state policy and localism. These matters do not
receive the attention they deserve and therefore the broader discussion
of how to address municipal insolvency and the role of municipal
bankruptcy is lacking.
V. RE-AsSESSING TENTH AMENDMENT LIMITATIONS
UNDER CHAPTER

9

More than twenty years ago, authors Michael McConnell and
Randall Picker proposed that municipal bankruptcy proceedings
should result in grants of power that force politically unpopular
decisions on governments, including those that may produce more
efficient forms of municipal organization. 69 These observations
reflect the reality that the limitations placed on bankruptcy courts
under Chapter 9 render them incapable of leading municipalities and
states to account for some underappreciated structural determinants of
insolvency-particularly those that accrue to local government
organization. In its current form, Chapter 9 lets states off the hook for
local government organization regimes that produce disparities in
local resources within metropolitan areas.
Before exploring the capacity of federal bankruptcy courts to
address the structural drivers of municipal insolvency, it's necessary
to understand the architecture of municipal bankruptcy. Chapter 9
bankruptcy is not available to every failing municipality. Only
twenty-four states either specifically or conditionally authorize
68. See MunicipalIdentity, supra note 49, at 650-52.
69. See Michael W. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A
ConceptualIntroductionto MunicipalBankruptcy,60 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 470 (1993).
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municipal bankruptcies. 70 States cannot petition for bankruptcy
relief. The threshold requirements for a municipality seeking
bankruptcy relief are that they must, (1) be specifically authorized by
state law to be a debtor, (2) be insolvent, (3) desire to effect a plan to
adjust its debts, and (4) engage in certain pre-filing efforts to work out
its financial difficulties.' Municipalities are also required to obtain
the agreement of creditors holding at least a majority in amount of
claims of each class of debtor and to negotiate in good faith with
creditors to obtain the agreement of the majority.72 In order to receive
court sanction of its debt adjustment plan, the debtor municipality
must have reached agreement toward a plan or must have failed to do
so despite good faith negotiations, or such negotiation must be
If the municipality meets these requirements,
impracticable.7 3
Chapter 9 automatically triggers a stay against creditor collection
efforts.7 This allows a municipality the ability to continue providing
basic public services while negotiating a debt adjustment plan with its
creditors.
Scholars have noted the significant differences between
bankruptcy for non-municipal debtors and municipal debtors.
Unlike in a Chapter 777 or Chapter 1178 bankruptcy proceedingthose provision that apply to individual and corporate bankruptcycourts have no authority to set limits on the discretion of city officials
or state officials in matters of local government organization and
management. 79 The court is merely authorized to determine
insolvency and assess the relative soundness of the municipality's

70. See, e.g., Lynn Hume, Bill Would Give More Rights to MunicipalEmployees in
Bankruptcies, THE BOND BUYER, Jun. 4, 2014, http://www.bondbuyer.com/news/washingtonbudget-finance/bill-would-give-more-rights-to-municipal-employees-in-bankruptcies1063100-1.html.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 109(c) (2012).
72. See, e.g., In rMendocino Coast Rec & Park Dist., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139697, at
6-7 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
73. See 11 U.S.C. 941-46 (2012); In re Cottonwood Water & Sanitation Dist., 138 BR
973, 979 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1992).
74. 11 U.S.C. § 922.
75. See Tung, supra note 5, at 893.
76. See Gillette, supra note 63, at 291-93; Thomas M. Horan & Ericka Fredricks
Johnson, The DebtorHas No Estate, and Other Tales, Why Chapter 9 Looks Different From
Chapter11, 32-10 ABIJ 22 (2013); McConnell & Picker, supranote 69, at 437-35.
77. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-84.
78. Id. §§ 1101-74.
79. See id.§ 904.
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plan for adjusting their debts.so
Unlike bankruptcy under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, creditors have
very few rights to participate in the development of the municipality's
debt readjustment plans. While the provisions of Chapter 9 require
the city to negotiate in good faith with its creditors, creditors have
little negotiating leverage under Chapter 9.81
During these
negotiations municipalities enjoy the exclusive right to submit debt
readjustment plans to the court. Creditors can only approve or
disapprove of the plans. Consequently, in addition to not receiving
debt payments because of the automatic stay triggered by the filing of
Chapter 9 bankruptcy, creditors cannot submit debt readjustment
plans of their own.8 2 Courts are also limited in doing anything more
than approving the debt adjustment plans. Chapter 9 permits the
adjustment of debts so long as the adjustment is "fair and equitable"
and does not "discriminate unfairly. 83
There is no liquidation under Chapter 9, as is a possibility under
Chapter 7. Bankruptcy courts can only hold out the threat of
dismissal, which would leave the debtor municipalities and their
creditors to their political and legal devices. 84 Two provisions of
Chapter 9 explicitly limit the reach of the bankruptcy courts: §§ 903
Section 903 preserves the state's autonomy over the
and 904.85
political and governmental powers of the municipality and § 904
limits the ability of the court to interfere with the municipality's
political or governmental powers, its property or revenues, or its use
or enjoyment of income-producing property.86 These provisions
effectively eliminate the bankruptcy court's ability to investigate the
structural causes of insolvency discussed herein. They increase the
possibility that municipal bankruptcy might be used repeatedly by
municipalities and states unwilling to address what are often
politically unsalable issues.
The rarity of municipal bankruptcy filings means that there is
80. See In re Wallace Cnty. Water Control and Improvement Dist. No. 1, 36 F. Supp. 36,
39 (S.D. Tex. 1940).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 943(b)(7). The "best interest of the creditor" requirement under
section 943(b)(7) has been treated similarly by courts to the Chapter 11 "good faith"
requirement articulated under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3).
82. See, e.g., Kimhi, supranote 1, at 651.
83. See, e.g., id. at 653.
84. See Pryor, supranote 5, at 122-23.
85. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 903-04.
86. Id.
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relatively little case law to guide bankruptcy judges if municipal
bankruptcy filings become more common. But early development of
Chapter 9 reveals the intentions and concerns behind the current
structure. Municipal bankruptcy evolved separate from corporate
bankruptcy and is marked by specific constitutional concerns related
to federalism. Prior to the enactment of Chapter 9 in 1937, the only
remedies available to creditors when a municipality was unable to pay
the creditors were for the creditors to pursue an action of mandamus
and compel the municipality to raise taxes or to seize its accounts. 7
The passage of the 1937 Municipal Bankruptcy Act changed all of
that. The design and scope of municipal bankruptcy is shaped in
large measure by the limits of the Contracts Clause and the Tenth
Amendment89 to the U.S. Constitution. The Contracts Clause
prohibits states from passing laws that impair existing contracts. 90
The bankruptcy code hinges upon the inapplicability of the Contracts
Clause to the federal government. States cannot pass laws that would
adjust a municipality's debt obligations. However, Congress is not
subject to the restriction that the Contracts Clause places on the
states. 91 Contracts may be impaired in a Chapter 9 bankruptcy case
without offending the U.S. Constitution.
The Tenth Amendment imprint on Chapter 9 reflects concerns
about the balance of federalism. 92 The Tenth Amendment provides
that the powers not delegated to the United States but the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the
states respectively, or to the people.9 3 State sovereignty meant that
Chapter 9 had to be a more limited version of bankruptcy; otherwise
bankruptcy courts would acquire the power to dissolve local
governments.
The first version of the municipal bankruptcy
legislation was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in the
1936 case Ashton v. Cameron County Improvement District.94 There
the Court opined,

87. See McConnell & Picker, supranote 69, at 445.
88. See Watkins, supranote 5, at 91 (citing Henry W. Lehmann, The FederalMunicipal
Baniavptcy, 5 J. FIN. 241, 245 (1950)).
89. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
90. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
91. See Ass'n of Retired Employees v. City of Stockton (In re Stockton), 478 B.R. 8, 16
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2012).
92. See McConnell & Picker, supranote 69.
93. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
94. Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).
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If obligations of States or their political subdivisions may be
subjected to the interference here attempted, they are no
longer free to manage their own affairs; the will of Congress
prevails over them; although inhibited, the right to tax might
be less sinister. And really the sovereignty of the State, so
often declared necessary to the federal system, does not

exist.9 5

Justice Cardozo's dissent in the closely decided case underscored
the extent to which state sovereignty was protected under the original
municipal bankruptcy statute. Cardozo rightly pointed out that the
initial federal act preserved state autonomy over local Rovernment
and limited federal oversight of governmental decisions. Cardozo
also pointed out that states had to grant their municipality's
permission to even petition for a Chapter 9 bankruptcy, the ultimate
deference to state sovereignty.9 7 If a state felt that Chapter 9
infringed upon their sovereignty, it was only because the state opted
to have their municipalities enter into federal bankruptcy in the first
place.
The statute was rewritten.
The revised act modified the
provisions on state approval of a municipality's petition and removed
counties from the statute. 98 The revised statute was upheld in United
States v. Bekis" and further transformed in Faitoute Iron & Steel
Co. v. Asbwy. 00 In Faitoute, the Court upheld a New Jersey law that
permitted a plan of adjustment over the objection of minority
creditors, allowing bankruptcy to be used as a tool to control minority
holdouts in municipal bankruptcy.' 0
Bankruptcy protection is not a right, and the only way for a
municipality to petition for Chapter 9 relief is with the permission of
its state. Justice Cardozo recognized this in his Ashton dissent. He
revealed a fundamental problem with the state and local distinction
under Chapter 9-that municipal bankruptcy is in effect the state
petitioning for federal intervention to stay the demands of creditors
95. Id.at 531.
96. See id. at 538-40 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
97. See id.
98. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 69, at 453.
99. United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
100. Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
101. See McConnell & Picker, supra note 76, at 453-54.
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and reorganize the debts of a unit of its governance structure. This
essential feature of municipal bankruptcy calls into question whether
there are significant-federalism concerns with §§ 903 and 904.
Given what has already been covered about the fiscal constraints
on cities, the ability of states to both exclusively authorize cities to
petition for bankruptcy relief and set the conditions within which
local fiscal autonomy is exercised considerably minimizes any threat
to their sovereignty under Chapter 9. It is worth exploring whether §§
903 and 904 of Chapter 9 have been drawn too narrowly and might be
loosened to allow bankruptcy courts to pierce the veil of Chapter 9's
state sovereignty protections. This might lead states to address issues
of local government organization prior to allowing their
municipalities to petition for Chapter 9 relief. While the Tenth
Amendment rights of states are well grounded, it is worthy to ponder
whether states should expect to relinquish some of these protections
in the Chapter 9 bankruptcy proceedings of their municipalities.
Allowing for qualified sovereignty under §§ 903 and 904 would
permit bankruptcy courts to inquire into issues of local government
organization and administration by the states if the bankruptcy judge
deemed such information pertinent to assessing the root causes of
default. Bankruptcy Judges could, for instance, approximate risk
associated with the structure of local government organization at the
state level and encourage municipalities (and their states) to address
such risk in the debt adjustment plans the municiplaities submit to the
court. Debt adjustment plans might then require states to contribute
more towards debt adjustment, which would likely occur through the
redistribution of state tax revenues towards the struggling
municipality in a manner otherwise complicated by the politics of
localism.
Loosening the restrictions of §§ 903 and 904 allows root causes
to be considered during debt readjustment. With a focus on root
causes, possible features of debt adjustment might include requiring
the state to consider municipal consolidations, inter-governmental
agreements, or forced boundary modifications that would provide
new tax revenue sources for struggling municipalities while enforcing
other measures to actually restructure debt obligations. States might
revisit revenue sharing plans and other devices that more equitably
spread the legacy costs of older central cities-specifically their
concentration of poorer populations of residents and non-taxable
property-across the entire state. Revising Chapter 9 to encourage
the pursuit of these types of regional approaches to metropolitan
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government constitute a caveat to an otherwise painless process for
the state as a whole.
Such reforms to Chapter 9 would challenge local sovereignty as
an a-political pursuit. Doing so might open dialogue on the
interdependence of a state's communities and the various fictions that
stem from the social and political construction of jurisdiction.
Advancing these regionalist gains might involve unintended
consequences, as the minority of states that allow their municipalities
to petition for Chapter 9 relief might be dis-incentivized from seeking
such protection. Given the benefits Watkins outlined and summarized
at the outset of this essay, this could impair opportunities for
municipal government reform.' 02
There are bigger questions that naturally arise in assessing the
viability of this approach. Why expand the reach of federal
bankruptcy courts in service of the problems of political
fragmentation, metropolitan resource imbalances and the municipal
boundary problem? Are the bankruptcy courts the appropriate forum
for the consideration of regional governance structures? Are these
issues not fundamentally prerogatives of the state for the people of the
respective states to solve without the interference of courts? Is it even
possible to narrowly tailor a solution that does not run afoul of the
Tenth Amendment, but is substantially sufficient to bring about the
intended changes?
These and other legitimate questions must be addressed in any
reconsideration of Chapter 9. Local government organization can be
one of many factors impacting fiscal insolvency and while its relative
share of causality for a city's slide into bankruptcy is difficult if not
impossible to determine, it is a significant determinant to a city's
fiscal fate. But what is clear is that as it now stands, Chapter 9 offers
states and their municipalities extraordinary debt relief while largely
containing the impact of the municipality's insolvency to the
municipality and its creditors. This may help cities in the short term,
but it allows cities and states to exit bankruptcy with inefficient,
inequitable and fundamentally unsustainable governance structures
intact.
VI. CONCLUSION
The role of a state's laws for local government organization play
102. See Watkins, supranote 5, 104-15.
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in shaping a municipality's fiscal fate should be afforded greater
consideration in the broader discussion of municipal insolvency.
While Chapter 9 remains a relativey rare and extreme course for
resolving municipal insolvency, it is one whose use has increased in
recent years and the prospect of growing fiscal challenges for cities
across the nation warrants a reconsideration of the various methods
for resolving fiscal crisis, including bankruptcy.
With more municipal defaults likely ahead, it is necessary that
Chapter 9 be examined not just for its ability to provide relief to
municipalities that have hit rock bottom, but also for its untapped
potential in urging states to address local government organization,
particularly the problems of political fragmentation and the municipal
boundary problem. It is beyond the scope of this essay to determine if
that can be done in a way that does not offend the federalism concerns
that are at the heart of §§ 903 and 904 of Chapter 9. But Justice
Cardozo's Ashton dissent suggests it is a worthwhile exercise.
Bankruptcy is not a right, and if states are willing to allow their
municipalities to file bankruptcy petitions, they should also be willing
to accept inquiries into how the state sets the conditions for local
fiscal management as well as how its laws on local government
organization impact the fiscal health of its municipalities.
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